

CHAPTER III

New York under British Rule—1675-1763

FLOUR, PIRATES, SLAVES



GOVERNOR EDMUND ANDROS took the best visions of his predecessors and the best single attempts to develop world trade at the Port of New York and coordinated them. He instituted a drive for colonial prosperity through exports, a well-organized and successful campaign under which the whole area thrived—and the City of New York was its gateway. His one blind spot blacked out the customhouse; he never learned that high duties bred smugglers.

Andros in 1675 procured the adoption by his council of resolutions urging the creation of a “harbour . . . before ye City of New York,” the prohibition of casting anchors or grapnel at the Battery sea wall, and of throwing refuse into the harbor waters, the last an important sanitary innovation. On his orders the pestilential canal, De Heere Gracht, was filled in, and the resulting highway, wider than the usual street of the time, was named Broad Street. Of more importance was the new city dock, built of stone, which extended along the shore front from Whitehall Slip to Coenties Slip and the City Hall. This was finished in 1675. Andros also made the usual preferential tariff (ten versus two per cent) for English and against other imports.

The colony was already realizing a quick cash income in the milling of wheat and its export, either as flour or hardtack. Farmers, especially

those in the Hudson Valley, were presaging Yankee ingenuity in the kinds of wheat they could adapt to the moist Eastern climate, and the blends of flour, not to say the varieties of packing they could evolve and profitably export. Andros quickly realized that even the most honest and farsighted miller could not possess the skill, the variety of wheats, or the machinery to grind, sift, and blend the proper kinds of wheat at the proper seasons and in the proper and requisite states of ripeness and dryness. The alternative, he also realized, was that the term "New York flour" would soon become either meaningless or worse. Quality was necessary then as now, but uniformity was almost more important. He resolved to achieve uniformity at the bottleneck, where the wheat comes to mill and where, being ground, it passes through screens of fine sifting cloth. This, the final process, is bolting, and in the bolting laws Andros identified pure-food legislation as a necessary adjunct of profitable world trade. Such legislation involved monopoly of one manufacturing process. There were complaints from individuals whose business the acts harmed, but in the long run the colony benefited.

Though various laws in the series of bolting acts were repealed, amended, or ignored, the long-range effect was regularity of process and uniformity of product. The beneficial effect upon the Port itself appears statistically: in 1678 the city had three ships, seven sloops, and eight small boats; in 1694, when criticism of the monopolistic features of the bolting acts was at its height, the city had sixty ships, sixty-two sloops, and forty boats. Eventually Andros brought about six hundred families out of a total of nine hundred and eighty-three into the flour industry.

Shortly after he had been recalled Andros wrote a justification of his administration. He claimed that on his arrival he found New York "poore, unsettled, and without trade, except a few small coasters; hardly any went or came from beyond seas;" but he left the town "greatly increased in people, trade, buildings, and other improvements; new townes and settlements lately built. ...A market house (the only

one in all those parts) . . . and the navigation increased at least ten times to what it was; and plenty of money (hardly seen there before) . . . and noe disaster happened in any part of the government during my command there. . . .”

One can fairly balance Andros’ achievements against even his conspicuous and dramatic blunders: the emphasis on high duties, the unwarranted invasion of New Jersey and arrest of Governor Carteret, his administrations’ failure to act forcibly against smuggling or against piracy.

Pirates Spread on Troubled Waters

The last quarter of the eighteenth century saw a general state of war in Europe in which England, Holland, Spain, France, and Portugal took part. The conflict, periodically interrupted by short-lived peace treaties, became a desultory kind of naval guerrilla war, with the individual ship captains not too discriminating about whom they attacked and plundered. The commissioned privateers of each country were granted the right to capture enemy vessels and sell their cargoes as prizes of war. This privilege proved too strong a temptation for many of the privateer captains. With huge profits in sight, they made “mistakes” with alarming frequency. In most cases the captain and crew shipped for a voyage on the basis of “no plunder, no pay;” in other words, they took on the adventure at the risk of their lives for what they could get out of it through attacking enemy ships. Another inducement to piracy was the voiding of a privateer’s commission after each peace treaty, leaving captain and crew without employment.

A surprising number of privateers who began in what was officially a legitimate occupation soon became out-and-out pirates under these conditions. Many of them felt to the end, which was often the end of a rope, that what they had done was right and proper.

The important Red Sea trade had its inception many years before the beginning of the eighteenth century, but it reached its peak about that time. On the huge unsettled island of Madagascar, off the East African

coast, privateers and pirates of all nations established a haven of refuge for themselves.

Although pirates roamed all the chief trade routes of the world, most of their recorded activities centered around the West Indies, the east coasts of North America, and the Red Sea. Ships bearing Red Sea commerce at the time had to reach Europe by the long route around the Cape of Good Hope, and the Madagascar pirates were in a strategic position to raid the richest and probably the most exotic commerce the world then knew.

New York merchants soon discovered that here was a source of handsome profit, and the Red Sea trade flooded the markets of the city with looted fabrics, spices, jewels, and Arabian gold. The Port of New York became a pirate center.

Murderous pirates, some of them notorious figures, walked the streets of the city with impunity. The goods they brought ashore filled the counters of merchants. Fashionable women bought the silks and brocades, the jewels, and the porcelains; gentlemen about town strolled the Bowery in embroidered waistcoats and silver shoe buckles, carrying jeweled swords.

The Man Higher Up

Piracy became so common that it was accepted by a large section of the public as a near profession. It is necessary to understand this state of mind in order to account for the amazing condonation of robbery and murder at sea as legitimate endeavor. For one thing, the public seldom heard the bloody details—and when they did the stories were told in a manner calculated to evoke applause for the pirates' wit and courage; for another, the game was made respectable to many by its open or covert tie-up with the names of some of the most influential and respected citizens and officials of New York.

The case of Frederick Philipse is illustrative of the wealth, influence, and respectability that often lay behind pirate ventures. The

founder of the Philipse family was of Dutch descent, the name originally having been Vrederyck Felypsen. He is believed to have reached New Amsterdam in 1658. Poor at first, he became a fur trader. His real success came after he married, in 1662, Margaret Hardenbroch, widow of the rich fur trader, Pieter de Vries. Philipse immediately entered a number of enterprises and gathered great wealth in a few years. His best-known operations were in real estate. Eventually the Philipse estate ranged all the way from the Croton River to Spuyten Duyvil. The manor house still stands in Yonkers, while a Dutch church, built in 1699 by Philipse and his second wife, Catharine Van Cortlandt, remains in service at Tarrytown.

Surrounded by the evidence of his respectability at Philipse Manor, Philipse bought and sold pirate vessels, outfitted smugglers, and arranged for the exchange of goods and money in such far-off pirate strongholds as Madagascar. History is definite about Philipse's place in the life of at least one pirate, Captain Samuel South Burgess.

Burgess, of good education, was a purely local product, having been born in New York City. His early experience included privateering in the West Indies. Philipse liked him and decided to use him as a trader with the pirates in Madagascar, where Philipse and other owners sent ships to trade liquor, guns, ammunition, and money for the cloths, spices, and jewels of the East.

Captain Burgess committed several acts of piracy on this first voyage for Philipse; in Madagascar he proved a good trader and sailed back to New York with a full hold. Off Sandy Hook he unloaded the cargo and then wrecked the ship, landing in New York as an honest shipwrecked mariner. Meanwhile the goods were smuggled into the city sans tax. After marrying a relative of his employer, he made two voyages in legitimate trading. He then had the misfortune to be captured off Good Hope and was taken to England, where he was charged with piracy. Burgess was tried twice; the second time he received the death sentence but was pardoned by Queen Anne.

He then shipped as mate on *H.M.S. Neptune*, which sank two pirate ships. However, when the *Neptune* was in turn taken by pirates, he cast his lot with them. His subsequent career was usual for the type, ending with violent death—in Burgess' case, by poisoning.

Bonded Pirates

Benjamin Fletcher received the appointment as Royal Governor of New York in 1692. He soon became friendly with the pirates of New York City and was accused of selling them permission to land at the Port for the price of one hundred dollars a man. In 1697 the Lords of Trade wrote from London, warning him not to protect “marauders,” who, they had been informed, used New York as a place of refuge. Fletcher defended himself by declaring that he never gave protection without his council's approval and that the pirates had given bonds for good behavior. He claimed further, in apparent seriousness, that he could not be blamed if the privateers he commissioned later became pirates and that he only associated with pirates for the purpose of reforming them.

Captain Kidd

Lord Bellomont, who succeeded Fletcher in 1698, made the first large dent in buccaneering activities, although, curiously enough, he was responsible for the vivid career of one of the most famous of them all—Captain William Kidd.

During Fletcher's regime many pirates sailed from the Port of New York, among them such rogues as Richard Glover, John Evans, Thomas Wake, John Ireland, and Edward Coates. It was for the purpose of rounding up such pirates that Bellomont and the British Admiralty made an agreement in 1695 with Kidd, whereby he as a privateer was to protect English ships.

The government of King William III would not furnish a ship for Kidd to command, so Bellomont, Philip Livingston of New York, and

some friends raised money for the *Adventure Galley*—287 tons, 34 guns. Kidd and his crew sailed in 1696 under the “no plunder, no pay” agreement. When the captain found no pirates in more than a year, the crew was on the verge of mutiny. When Kidd allowed a Dutch vessel to go free because its papers were in order, one William Moore, a gunner, protested vehemently. In the ensuing argument the captain smashed a bucket over his gunner’s head, killing him. This act later became the basis of murder charges against Kidd.

Not long afterward the captain seized the *Quedagh Merchant*, an Armenian ship sailing under French registry. He changed ships and put in to Ste. Marie, Madagascar, for provisions. Here all but thirteen of the crew deserted, but with these and a few new men Kidd sailed homeward. Meanwhile it had become known in New York that Kidd, instead of taking pirate ships and French merchantmen, had himself become a pirate.

King William III had commissioned Bellomont Governor of New York and Massachusetts on June 18, 1697. When he arrived in New York to begin his administration on April 2, 1698, he carried orders from the Crown to arrest Kidd if he returned to North America.

Captain Kidd cruised the West Indies and there learned he was wanted as a pirate on complaint of the Mocha fleet merchants of India. Deciding to straighten out things with Bellomont, he sailed to New York but found the Governor’s answers to his emissary ambiguous. He thereupon sailed for Boston and, on the way, buried what treasure he had on Gardiners Island; but it was soon recovered by Bellomont’s men.

When Kidd reached Boston in July 1699, he was immediately seized on a warrant by Bellomont. Since piracy had never been a hanging offense in the colonies, he was transported to England for trial. The trial took place at the Old Bailey in 1701. Captain Kidd was found guilty of murder and piracy and was accordingly hanged at Execution Dock. This seems strange justice after the leniency accorded Burgess, who deserved the title of pirate far more than did Kidd.

Under Lord Bellomont the Port was fairly well cleared of pirates. In 1699 warships were stationed off Sandy Hook. In 1700 Bellomont was instructed to give clearance only to those vessels posting bond not to call at Madagascar or other outlaw gathering places. The high tide of piracy had been reached; the ebb had begun; yet for more than a hundred years these sea marauders remained in existence.

Some Pirates Died in Bed

A few of the pirates turned respectable or bought immunity. Joseph Thwaites, incomparably more homicidal than Kidd, began his career in 1763 by entering the Turkish service as commander of a forty-four-gun frigate. He roamed the Mediterranean for some years, building a fortune, which he secreted in England and New York. He adhered to the theory that "dead men tell no tales," making a practice of drowning his prisoners. When pressure for his capture became too insistent, he took his valuables to New York, built a mansion near the city, and settled down to life as a country gentleman. A year later he died of snakebite.

John Avery made a specialty of preying on the Mocha fleets, his largest haul being the *Gunsway*, which belonged to the Great Mogul himself. He seized one hundred thousand pieces of eight (roughly one hundred thousand dollars) and a treasure in diamonds. Avery arrived in America in 1696 with the diamonds and what was left of the money. Unable to dispose of the diamonds in America, he found willing merchants in England, settling then in Devon. The English merchants accepted the diamonds, promising to send him money as they disposed of the gems. The money came slowly and in small amounts, then not at all. Avery became ill and died a pauper.

A pirate named Charles Vane enjoyed a few years of local respectability, although eventually he was hanged in Jamaica. During all this time it is probable that a majority of the sailors who frequented the Port had, or had once had, intimate acquaintance with the "free citizens of the world," answering that wild cry, "All up and board!" Many of them lived to pull a rope or strain at a windlass on the later privateers.

Slave Traders

Like the Red Sea traffic with pirates, the slave trade was an important contributing factor in the life of the Port. New York, a melting pot of goods as well as men, found the two synonymous when the unfortunate blacks began to arrive. But those newcomers who survived the horrors of the voyages early formed a habit of disappearing shortly after their arrival. This is small wonder when it is considered that, in transit and during the "seasoning" period, the death rate among slaves "sardined" into this country averaged as high as fifty per cent.

It is most astonishing and impressive to look over the list of those engaged, in one way and another, in the slave traffic. Some of New York's foremost families diverted their capital or ships to this commerce. Between 1715 and the Revolution the Port's merchant-ship owners went in for the highly profitable traffic quite extensively, transporting thousands of Negroes to the West Indies, to Southern colonial markets, and additional hundreds to Manhattan.

Light is thrown on the operations of the slave traders by the contents of a letter written March 30, 1762, by John Watts of New York to a Salem shipowner:

For this market they must be young the younger the better if not quite Children, those advanced in years will never do. I should imagine a cargo of them none exceeding thirty might turn out at fifty pounds a head gross Sales. Males are best. . . . Our duty is four pounds a head from the West Indies forty shillings from Africa. New Jersey pays none at all for which reason the Master might lay a mile or two below the Town and send up word.

This sending up word was apparently in the best tradition of the Port. Behind the scenes, "below the Town," contraband and slaves were constantly being slipped into the province, unrecorded and duty free.

Smuggling flourished primarily because of the shortsightedness of Britain. Through the series of Navigation Acts the Crown had said to its colonial merchants, in effect: "You must buy all your manufactures through us or from us; you may not establish your own plants; because

we must protect our own farmers we'll buy only a fraction of the produce raised by yours; and since we must defend the profits of our own merchants at all costs, you may export certain 'enumerated' commodities only, in British ships only, and only to British ports." What but smuggling on a vast scale could possibly result?

In one respect, however, the British held the trump card: the manufactures of Great Britain were cheaper and better than those of the Continent. The inevitable outcome was a trade balance unfavorable to the colonials.

Cadwallader Colden, later Lieutenant Governor of the province and prolific writer on colonial affairs, observed in 1723 that mercantile profit "seldom continues in the province six months before it is remitted for England."

Under these circumstances, and to square accounts with the British, the merchant shippers of New York established and fostered the foreign West Indies trade as a ready market for surplus colonial commodities. The West Indies needed North American timber, fish, and flour; they could furnish unlimited quantities of sugar, rum, and molasses. Molasses meant rum; rum meant slaves; slaves meant cash.

War Clouds with Silver Linings

Privateering, near the middle of the century, was highly profitable for those engaged in it. During 1744, to take one isolated year as an example, the New York *Post-Boy* devoted considerable space to a listing of prize ships brought into New York Harbor by privateers, to the great enrichment of captains and crews. One privateer, the *Launceston*, was reported as arriving with the French ship *St. Francois Xavier*, three hundred tons; the *Post-Boy* recorded:

This is the fifteenth vessel taken from this ship. She was saluted by all our Privateers, and several other vessels, and the general Acclamation of the People, as a Testimony of the Sense they have of the signal Service done by this gentleman during the continuance of the war.

The gentleman referred to was “the brave Commodore Warren,” the same Sir Peter Warren who played a decisive part in the siege of Louisburg and whose three-hundred-acre Manhattan farm covered much of the site of Greenwich Village.

An impression of the times is given by the many advertisements appearing in the weekly papers, of which the following from the *Post-Boy* is a good example :

For a Cruize on a Privateering Voyage,
against His Majesty’s Enemies
The Ship, TARTAR, JOHN MACKY, Commander,
Burthen 300 tons, 18 Carriage and 20 Swivel
Guns, 120 men. Flush Fore and Aft; being
completely fitted and equipped as a Ship of
War for said voyage, and will sail in 20 Days
All Gentlemen, Sailors and Others, inclined to go
on said Cruize, may repair to the Sign of the
Crown & Thistle, in Front Street, where the Officers
Attend, and the Articles are to be seen and signed.

Thus, anomalously, the Port grew strong because of wars rather than in spite of them. Wars, therefore, were not unpopular, and there was always plenty of action for the fighting men. And for those with no liking for arms, there was the flag of truce which could be used for personal protection without foregoing possible profits.

Theoretically the flag of truce was an eighteenth-century custom designed to facilitate the exchange of prisoners. But when a ship sailed out with prisoners to be exchanged in some of the French islands for “such of our countrymen as may have fallen in the enemy’s hands,” there was nothing to prevent cargoes of foodstuffs from being taken on board as well as prisoners.

That these practices were condemned by many is gathered from an indignant letter to the editor of the *Post-Boy*, dated June 6, 1748, and significantly signed “Free Trader:”

Can it be unknown to you that scarce a week passed without an illicit Trader going or coming into this Port, under the specious name of Flags of Truce, who are continually supplying and supporting our most avowed enemies, to the great loss and damage of all honest traders and true-hearted subjects? . . . Let me beg you to sound the alarm . . . that all may know how the whole community, for the private benefit of a few mercenaries, must soon be engulfed in ruin and destruction.

It soon became clear that the New York “mercenaries” were doing much better for themselves than Free Trader suspected. In 1754-63, during the French and Indian War, a fleet of one hundred and twenty-eight privateers brought home eighty prizes valued at a million pounds sterling, and this figure did not include the attractive penny turned by the local merchants in transporting food supplies to the French armies.

Trade with the enemy flourished particularly during the first five or six years of the French and Indian War. Governor Hardy had tried to stop it almost as soon as hostilities began. He embargoed “all ships clearing out with provisions, but such as are loading, or to be laden for His Majesty’s Islands or Plantations.”

But this drastic measure, like others of its kind, failed rather signally, to judge by the fact that many New Yorkers promptly found means of establishing trade with the foreign islands. This is confirmed by Hardy himself in a letter to the Lords of Trade, written at Halifax on July 10, 1757 (after his resignation as Governor of the province). Hardy inveighs against the introduction of:

. . . tea, canvas, Gunpowder and arms for the Indians and many other Articles from Holland that render to His Majesty no Duty in Europe, and almost totally discourage the Importation of these commoditys from Brittain. When I first arrived at New York I found this iniquitous trade in a very flourishing state, and upon inquiry was informed that it had been a common practice for Vessels to come from Holland, stop at Sandy Hook, and smuggle their Cargoes to New York and carry their Vessels up empty; this I was determined to put an end to, when this trade took another course by sending their Vessels to the ports of Connecticut, from whence it is not very difficult to introduce their goods thro the sound to New York, and

even to Philadelphia . . . Another method the Importers take is to stop at some of the Out ports of Britain (in their outward bound passage from Holland) and make a report and enter only half of their cargo, by which the King is defrauded of his Duty on the other half. In short My Lords, if some effectual means are not used, the greatest part of the commerce of the American Colonies will be withdrawn from the Mother Country, and be carried to Holland.

It was not long after Governor Hardy's departure that Lieutenant Governor De Lancey reported deals by the colonials with the enemy, "having had credible information that there were some vessels (two in particular I had proof of) that had been trading with the French at Cape Francois in Hispaniola."

Colonial shippers intensified rather than lessened their treasonable traffic with the French during the following months. Reliable estimates put the number of provision-laden vessels that docked at Monte Christi in 1760 at more than five hundred. This illegal provision trade with the French West Indies helped to prolong the English-French wars. Thoroughly aroused by such flagrant disregard for the British law, the government of the newly crowned George III went into action, and Prime Minister William Pitt ordered the commanders of His Majesty's fleets in North America to take action against the illegal trade. Ships of the Royal Navy began raiding Dutch and French island ports in the West Indies. Revenue agents, armed with blank search warrants, were prodded into something approaching enforcement of the Molasses Act, which placed prohibitive duties on the importation of that commodity from other than British sources. Seizures, arrests, and confiscations increased sharply, but not for long and not for much. During 1761 duties were collected amounting to £1189, as against the £259 collected in 1755.

But the American coast was a long patrol, and with Britain at war only a limited number of ships were available for enforcement. Furthermore, American skippers not only were naturally adept, but had had decades of practice at navigating in the dark of the moon. They knew all the bars and channels, the secluded inlets and landing places. And

revenue officers could still be induced to wink when occasion warranted.


Colonials Keep "Connections"

Another obstacle to enforcement was lack of convictions. New York merchants still retained their "connections" with the courts—a factor which prompted Colden, on one occasion, to demand the removal of Judge Robert Livingston, "since no cause of any consequence can come before him in which . . . he or the Livingston family are not interested." Finally—and fatally—Britain was dealing with a lawlessness that enlisted the support and sympathy of a large section of the populace. By the middle of the century smuggling in our young and struggling country had advanced from an expedient to a virtue, and compliance with the tariffs had become a quixotic eccentricity.


Just as the Molasses Act of 1733 was "more honour'd in the breach than the observance," so the high-tariff Sugar Act of 1764 came to be of little moment, although the creaking machinery of English law enforcement moved to enforce it. This may be said to be the turning point of colonial history, marking the final phase of a revolt that had been brewing for nearly a century. Always profitable, smuggling now assumed the color and fervor of patriotism.

Barter and Exchange

At the beginning of the eighteenth century New York appears to have had about half as much trade as Boston, and about one third of it was in direct violation of the navigation laws. The West Indies trade was handled so intelligently that it grew steadily, and throughout the remainder of the colonial period rivaled the fur trade in its profits. Provisions were shipped from New York and exchanged for West Indies products, which were taken to England and then again exchanged for manufactured goods. These were brought back to New York and sold, and thus there were three profits on each transaction. The bulk of this



The Stadhuys, 1679, corner of Pearl Street and Coenties Slip



Courtesy of the New-York Historical Society (ID#695c)

New York (City) about 1793-96 seen from the North (Hudson) River
opposite Battery Place by Archibald Robertson (Engraving)

traffic was with the British islands; there was more trade with Barbados than with any of the other islands, as provisions were taken there, not only for the local supply, but also for transportation to the Spanish coast and the French islands. Most of the trade was merely an exchange of products, but a considerable cash balance resulted, which was remitted at once to England to pay for manufactured goods.

New York did not neglect ordinary trade, but it grew slowly. From 1717 to 1720 imports averaged £21,000 and exports £52,000 annually. From 215 to 235 vessels cleared yearly, the figures being about the same for Philadelphia. The city lived almost wholly on trade with Indians, Great Britain, and the West Indies. To England the traders sent mostly beaver, whale oil, and some tobacco; to the West Indies flour, bread, peas, and pork, and sometimes horses, and they brought back "rum which pays duty, and molasses which does not."

The middle years of the century brought a vast increase in docking facilities, shipping, shipbuilding, and commerce generally. Despite the severity of British restrictions, the Port made mammoth strides. From 1747 to 1762 the number of ships owned by residents of New York increased from 99 to 447, and the number of employed seamen from 755 to 3552. Ten years later 709 vessels were owned in the city, and exports had risen to £150,000 annually, with £100,000 as the figure for imports. It must be remembered that official figures on imports and exports take no cognizance of the value of goods handled by smugglers and therefore represent only a fraction of the trade which was actually entering and leaving the Port. How small a fraction can only be guessed, but it has been estimated that, for every cargo seized by the customs authorities, a dozen were discharged surreptitiously.

Shipbuilding and Growth

An increase in shipbuilding followed the growth of trade. From the modest beginnings of Mynheer Rip van Dam, toward the close of the seventeenth century, three busy shipyards had sprung up between

Beekman Street, northern limit of the town, and the Catharine Street docks. John Dally, John Rivers, and the brothers Joseph and Daniel Latham were, until William Walton eclipsed them all, New York's notable shipwrights.

By the time of the Treaty of Paris, 1763, the city's population had passed the thirteen-thousand mark (it had been 4476 in 1700); its wealth had increased tremendously, and a new class of mercantile capitalists—pushing aside or absorbing the earlier landowner-merchants—was figuring in the river, coastal, inland, and ocean trades. These men could see that the old cycle of molasses, rum, slaves, smuggling, and an unfavorable trade balance had little connection with the changed conditions, and that the new approach which was called for was necessarily one antagonistic to the interests of Great Britain.

The interior was increasing its shipments of agricultural products to New York, calling for increased varieties and quantities of the city's merchandise, and trade generally was vigorous, but Great Britain's restrictions were increasing in severity. Further taxation, with or without representation, was the last thing the merchants wanted.

Commerce had become the battleground of power. Whereas monarchs had once ruled, simply and without hypocrisy, through naked force, now they governed by customs percentages. If the Molasses Act proved ineffective, there was the Sugar Act; if the Stamp Act failed of its purposes, there were the other Acts of Trade.

A new sequence was beginning and new forces gathering. The colonials' traditional answer to tyranny was to boycott.